Two Men's Clothing Stores That Compete for Most of the Market

Two men's clothing stores that compete for most of the market in a small town in Ohio and will choose their weekly advertising levels sequentially. The newspaper advertising department calls the clothing stores in alphabetical order to find out how much advertising each firm wishes to buy. Somehow - and nobody at the newspaper knows exactly how this happens - Arbuckle's advertising decision "leaks out" to Mr. B's, which then knows Arbuckle's advertising decision when it makes its advertising decision for the week.
The following payoff table facing the two firms, Arbuckle & Son and Mr. B's, shows the weekly profit outcomes for the various advertising decision combinations. The payoff table is common knowledge. Use this payoff table to construct the appropriate sequential decision on the blank game tree provided below. Then answer questions .
$\begin{array} { l } &\text {Mr: B's aavertisinglevel }\\ \text {Arbuckle \& Son advertising level }&\begin{array}{l|l|l|}& \text {High }& \text { Low }\\\hline High &\mathrm{A}&\mathrm{B}\\& {\$ 4,000, \$ 4,000} &{\$ 3,000, \$ 5,000} \\\hline Low &\mathrm{C}&\mathrm{D}\\&{\$ 5,000} \$ 3,000 & {\$ 3,500, \$ 3,500} \\\hline\end{array}\\\end{array}$

-By making its advertising decision after Arbuckle and Son, Mr. B's

A) enjoys a first-mover advantage.
B) enjoys a second-mover advantage.
C) does not end up any better off than if it made its advertising decision first.
D) can secure a $5,000 profit payoff for itself.
E) both b and d.