Table 23-2
Suppose a town is to vote on three possible locations for a new park: A, B, or C. The preferences are in Table 23-2. Suppose the mayor decides on the following Borda count voting scheme: For each option, we will give one point for last place, two points for second last, and three points for the third last etc. The outcome with the most points is the winner.

-Refer to the information provided. The Borda count fails to satisfy which of Arrow's properties of a perfect voting system?

Question

Table 23-2
Suppose a town is to vote on three possible locations for a new park: A, B, or C. The preferences are in Table 23-2. Suppose the mayor decides on the following Borda count voting scheme: For each option, we will give one point for last place, two points for second last, and three points for the third last etc. The outcome with the most points is the winner.
 
-Refer to the information provided. The Borda count fails to satisfy which of Arrow's properties of a perfect voting system?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The Borda count fails to satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, as adding a new option can change the outcome even if the new option is never chosen as a winner. In this case, adding the option D, which is ranked last by all voters, would change the winner from C to A. Therefore, the Borda count violates Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.

Table 23-2 Suppose a Town Is to Vote on Three Possible Locations