Employers can reduce the incentive of imperfectly monitored workers to shirk by:
A) better monitaring
B) lowrer wares
C) avoiding vear-end bonuses
D) mone of the monye

Question

Employers can reduce the incentive of imperfectly monitored workers to shirk by:
A) better monitaring
B) lowrer wares
C)  avoiding vear-end bonuses
D) mone of the monye

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

Better monitoring can increase the probability of detecting shirking behavior, which in turn can serve as a deterrent for workers to shirk. Lower wages and avoiding year-end bonuses may actually decrease job satisfaction and motivation, leading to further shirking behavior. "Mone of the money" is not a valid option.

Employers Can Reduce the Incentive of Imperfectly Monitored Workers to Shirk