The incentive of imperfectly monitored workers to shirk can be reduced by:
A) higher levels of monitaring and offerng year-end bonuses
B) higher levels of moritarin and lower waes
C) lower levels of monitaring and offering year-end bonuses
D) lower levels of monitarin and lower wages

Question

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

Higher levels of monitoring and offering year-end bonuses provide a stronger incentive for workers to perform well and reward them for doing so. This helps to counteract the temptation to shirk in the absence of constant monitoring. Lower levels of monitoring or wages may not provide enough incentive for workers to perform well, while higher levels of monitoring without a corresponding reward may create a stressful work environment and may not be sustainable in the long run.

The Incentive of Imperfectly Monitored Workers to Shirk Can Be