Passage Although the Primary Canon in the History of Political Thought

Passage
Although the primary canon in the history of political thought largely ignores the views of Immanuel Kant, he nevertheless was as important a political thinker as Rousseau, Locke, or even Aristotle.  Working in the context of the Prussian Enlightenment, Kant championed the idea that the only innate right of human beings is freedom.  Fittingly, the centerpiece of his political theory is that freedom can be the only basis for a just political state.A political theory that advances freedom as its core tenet may appear inherently problematic.  The very existence of a political state would seem to require limitations on the freedoms of those within it.  However, this presents no serious problem for Kant's theory.  The Kantian notion of political freedom-which stands in stark contrast to the notion of transcendental freedom widely associated with Kant's nonpolitical writings-is restricted to the external relations between human persons.  In its political sense, freedom refers to the innate right of every person to independence from being constrained by another's choice.  In other words, every person has the innate right to make choices freely but only so long as these choices do not interfere with those of others.  Laws that do not allow for political freedom are forbidden in Kant's view because within a just civil condition, the promulgation of a law requires that an entire people agree to be subjected to it.There are more substantive problems facing Kant's political theory.  Most notable among these concerns is Kant's promotion of welfare legislation.  As he says, "The government is authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary and basic needs."  Given Kant's notion of political freedom, to enact such legislation would be catastrophic.  Welfare legislation violates Kant's own criterion regarding laws promulgated within a just civil condition: Governmental interference of this kind is a prime example of legislation on which an entire people will be divided.This was an egregious error on Kant's part.  At the same time, proponents of a Kantian conception of the state need neither embrace this result nor dismiss the possibility of consistently incorporating welfare legislation into their preferred brand of political theory.  Although Kant did not explicitly advocate it himself, a Kantian may hold that public provision of welfare is necessary for the state to fulfill its primary function-namely, protecting the liberties of its citizens.  For instance, if failing to adopt welfare legislation would threaten the continued existence, security, or stability of the state, then Kantians may justify such legislation on the grounds that it serves an instrumentally necessary role in upholding the fundamental aims and principles of Kantianism itself.  It is interesting to note that followers of Kant will likely have independent reasons to accept something along these lines.  Kant himself held that rational entities-such as persons, corporations, and states-have a duty of self-preservation, and thus are obligated to take measures to ensure their continued existence, security, and stability.There are still other issues surrounding a Kantian theory of the state.  These will need to be dealt with separately, but they should not go overlooked.  Breaking down the barriers that leave Kant outside the primary canon of political theory is a laudable task, which will take much effort to accomplish.
-To decide if welfare legislation is justified, proponents of a Kantian conception of the state would need to determine:

A) whether Kant advocated the type of welfare legislation being proposed for adoption by the state.
B) the extent to which political and social unrest influence the state.
C) whether welfare legislation provides citizens with independence from being constrained by others.
D) whether political freedom is instrumentally necessary for welfare legislation.