R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that moral arguments would have no force against a "completely apathetic person." Why is this a consequence of his theory? Do you agree with this claim?

Question

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The Answer is This consequence of Hare's theory arises from his emphasis on the importance of inclinations in moral reasoning. According to Hare, moral reasoning involves not only universalizing and prescribing moral judgments, but also taking into account our inclinations and the ability to imagine ourselves in the shoes of others. In his view, moral arguments are persuasive because they appeal to our inclinations and our ability to empathize with others.

However, if someone is completely apathetic and lacks any inclinations or the ability to empathize with others, then moral arguments would have no force against them. This is because they would not be swayed by appeals to universalizability, prescriptivity, or empathy. In other words, they would not be moved by the same considerations that make moral arguments persuasive to others.

Whether or not one agrees with this claim depends on one's views on the nature of moral reasoning and the role of inclinations and empathy in moral judgment. Some may argue that even completely apathetic individuals can be persuaded by rational arguments or that moral principles can be justified independently of inclinations and empathy. Others may agree with Hare that moral arguments would have no force against such individuals, given his emphasis on the role of inclinations and empathy in moral reasoning. Ultimately, the validity of this claim is a matter of ongoing debate in moral philosophy.