David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism

David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism?
Gauthier begins by claiming that morality faces a foundational crisis: morality's supposed authority depends on a worldview we no longer accept - one according to which the world is purposively ordered. Because of this, there is a serious question as to why we should accept the constraints of morality, given that these constraints purport to be independent of our desires and interests. This question becomes particularly pressing when obeying the dictates of morality would require sacrificing our interests for the sake of someone or something that we do not personally care about.
Some respond to this challenge by claiming that morality needs no justification. Gauthier claims that such a vindication is necessary, however. And we have an alternative method for justifying our actions that makes no reference to moral considerations. This method is that of deliberative justification, according to which an action is justified if and only if it maximizes the agent's expected utility (where utility is understood in terms of considered preferences) . Even if we were to do away with morality, we could still justify our actions via deliberative rationality.
Gauthier claims that there are three possible ways for morality to survive the challenge he has raised. One could argue that (i) we must postulate moral facts to explain our experiences, or (ii) one could argue that deliberative justification is somehow incomplete, or (iii) one could try to locate morality within the framework of deliberative rationality. Gauthier embraces the third way of resolving the crisis. He conceives of morality as a set of rules that constrain people's behavior, but that are mutually agreed on because they are to everyone's advantage. Because we gain more than we lose by submitting to such rules, deliberative rationality councils us to accept them.
-Gauthier claims that there is nothing for practical rationality to be besides:

A) moral justification.
B) deliberative justification.
C) epistemic justification.
D) an illusion.