Barbara Herman: on the Value of Acting from the Motive

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-In Herman's view, for a motive to be a moral motive, it must provide the agent with an interest in the moral rightness of his or her action.