Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, a partial belief is a belief that affects your self-interest. Does a connection to self-interest always call into question the credibility of a belief such that it requires additional confirmation to be justified? Can you think of any counterexamples?

Question

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The Answer is According to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, a belief that is partial, meaning it affects your self-interest, does indeed call into question the credibility of that belief and may require additional confirmation to be justified. This is because when our self-interest is at stake, we may be more likely to hold onto beliefs that benefit us personally, even if they are not objectively justified. However, there may be some counterexamples to this principle. For instance, a belief that benefits our self-interest may still be objectively justified if it aligns with widely accepted moral principles or if it is supported by strong evidence and reasoning. Additionally, there may be cases where a belief that benefits our self-interest is also in the best interest of others or aligns with moral duties, in which case it may not necessarily require additional confirmation to be justified. Ultimately, the connection to self-interest may raise doubts about the credibility of a belief, but it does not always invalidate its justification.