James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels notes that it is the object of a want that determines whether it is selfish or not.