In This Selection Churchland Examines Functionalism and the Two Prominent

In this selection Churchland examines functionalism and the two prominent versions of materialism in philosophy of mind. Reductivism claims that there is an identity of mental states with brain states. Functionalism rejects any one-to-one correlation between mental types and physical types and concentrates on the relationship between inputs and outputs. For example, the mental event of pain could be similar in two beings that have altogether different types of bodies and brains. Most functionalists are materialists, but someone could be a functionalist and be a nonmaterialist. Eliminative materialism is more radical than either of these other theories and seeks to eliminate "folk psychology"-talk of beliefs, feelings, and perceptions-in favor of more scientific descriptions of what is going on in the brain. Churchland concludes that the truth may be a combination of the two materialist theories, although the evidence points more in the direction of eliminativism.
-According to Churchland, the argument based on Leibniz's law-because mental states are introspectively known to me and because brain states are not introspectively known to me, my mental states are therefore not identical to my brain states-is

A) true.
B) fallacious.
C) based on false premises.
D) cogent.