Why do eliminative materialists believe that a smooth intertheoretic reduction between folk psychology and neurobiology is not possible? They don't think that mental states, such as thoughts, desires, fears, beliefs, and so forth, match up in a one-to-one correspondence to brain states (i.e., particular patterns of neuronal firings). Paul Churchland, for one, was convinced that folk-psychological terms were not simply incomplete representations of our inner states but rather that they were misrepresentations, in the way phlogiston was. Use the phlogiston example to argue the eliminative materialist's case that the poverty of our current conceptual framework will be overhauled with the advancement of neuroscience.

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The Answer of Why do eliminative materialists believe that a smooth intertheoretic reduction between folk psychology and neurobiology is not possible? They don't think that mental states, such as thoughts, desires, fears, beliefs, and so forth, match up in a one-to-one correspondence to brain states (i.e., particular patterns of neuronal firings). Paul Churchland, for one, was convinced that folk-psychological terms were not simply incomplete representations of our inner states but rather that they were misrepresentations, in the way phlogiston was. Use the phlogiston example to argue the eliminative materialist's case that the poverty of our current conceptual framework will be overhauled with the advancement of neuroscience.

Why Do Eliminative Materialists Believe That a Smooth Intertheoretic Reduction