Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
Below is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state and the citizen. Recall that E is the payoff that the citizen gets when she exits, L is the payoff that the state gets from retaining a loyal citizen, 0 is the payoff that the citizen gets from remaining loyal, and C is the cost that the citizen must pay for using voice.
Let E = 0.5, let L 1, and let C = 0.25.

-What are the equilibrium payoffs for each player if you use these payoff values?

Question

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
Below is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state and the citizen. Recall that E is the payoff that the citizen gets when she exits, L is the payoff that the state gets from retaining a loyal citizen, 0 is the payoff that the citizen gets from remaining loyal, and C is the cost that the citizen must pay for using voice.
Let E = 0.5, let L > 1, and let C = 0.25.
 
-What are the equilibrium payoffs for each player if you use these payoff values?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The equilibrium payoffs depend on the specific game and strategy profiles chosen by the players. Without the context of the game (e.g., its structure, strategies available to players, and how these strategies interact), it's impossible to accurately determine the equilibrium payoffs. However, choice C) .75; L suggests a specific numerical payoff for one player and a variable payoff for another, indicating a scenario where payoffs can be directly tied to a variable outcome (L). This could reflect a situation where one player's payoff is fixed while the other's depends on a variable factor, but without more information, this is speculative.