Above is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state (S) and the citizen (C). E is what the citizen gets from her exit option. R is what the state gets from the support (revenue) of the citizen. 0 is what the citizen gets for remaining loyal to the state. c is the cost for the citizen of exercising her voice option.
For the following questions, let R =2. Let c = 0.25.
-Given that the state depends on the citizen in this example (R 1), to what extent does the state's behavior depend on the attractiveness of the citizen's exit options?

Question

Above is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state (S) and the citizen (C). E is what the citizen gets from her exit option. R is what the state gets from the support (revenue) of the citizen. 0 is what the citizen gets for remaining loyal to the state. c is the cost for the citizen of exercising her voice option.
For the following questions, let R =2. Let c = 0.25.
-Given that the state depends on the citizen in this example (R > 1), to what extent does the state's behavior depend on the attractiveness of the citizen's exit options?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The Answer of  Above is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state (S) and the citizen (C). E is what the citizen gets from her exit option. R is what the state gets from the support (revenue) of the citizen. 0 is what the citizen gets for remaining loyal to the state. c is the cost for the citizen of exercising her voice option.
For the following questions, let R =2. Let c = 0.25.
-Given that the state depends on the citizen in this example (R > 1), to what extent does the state's behavior depend on the attractiveness of the citizen's exit options?

Above Is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game Between the State