Shapiro argues that since Elisabeth "defends neither a reductionist materialism nor a substance dualism, but rather wants to find a way of respecting the autonomy of thought without denying that this faculty of reason is in some essential way dependent on our bodily condition," therefore, Elisabeth is an epistemological monist.

Question

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

Shapiro's argument that Elisabeth seeks a middle ground between reductionist materialism and substance dualism, aiming to respect the autonomy of thought while acknowledging its dependence on our bodily condition, suggests a nuanced position that does not neatly fit into the category of epistemological monism. Epistemological monism typically asserts a single substance or principle underlying both mind and matter, which is not directly implied by Elisabeth's position as described.

Shapiro Argues That Since Elisabeth "Defends Neither a Reductionist Materialism