A functionalist account of mental concepts (believing, intending, desiring, etc.)
A) entails that the mind is a "ghost in a machine."
B) is incompatible with locating mental phenomena in the brain.
C) allows that a purely physical item might perform the functions.
D) commits one to physical realism.
Correct Answer:
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Q3: Observation sentences, Quine says,
A) are about the
Q4: Quine's criterion for ontological commitment
A) tells us
Q5: Naturalized epistemology
A) is basically third-person epistemology.
B) is
Q6: To say that Intentionality is a fundamental
Q7: Taking up Dennett's Intentional stance toward some
Q9: Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is supposed
Q10: The idea that there is "something it
Q11: When Mary, the neuroscientist, exits her black-and-white
Q12: The hard problem, according to David Chalmers,
Q13: Dennett's heterophenomenology is a technique for
A) giving
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