In the Berg et al. trust game, denote the amount sent by the Sender in the trust game as "S", the amount sent back by the Receiver in the trust game as "R", the amount sent by the Allocator in the triple dictator game by "X" and the amount sent by the Allocator in the dictator game as "Y". If the proportional amounts returned by the second movers in the trust game are motivated by altruism rather than reciprocity, then we would expect:
A) The proportion returned by the second movers in the trust game (R/3S) to be positively correlated with the amount sent by the allocators in the dictator game (Y) rather than the amount sent by the first movers in the trust game (S).
B) The proportion returned by the second movers in the trust game (R/3S) to be positively correlated with the amount sent by the first movers in the trust game (S) rather than to the amount sent by the allocators in the dictator game (Y).
C) The proportion returned by the second movers in the trust game (R/3S) to be positively correlated with the amount sent by the allocators in the triple dictator game (X) rather than to the amount sent by the allocators in the dictator game (Y).
D) The proportion returned by the second movers in the trust game (R/3S) to be positively correlated with the amount sent by the allocators in the dictator game (Y) rather than to the amount sent by the allocators in the triple dictator game (X).

Question

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

If the proportional amounts returned by the second movers in the trust game are motivated by altruism rather than reciprocity, it implies that their behavior is more likely to be consistent across different contexts of unilateral giving, such as the dictator game. Therefore, a positive correlation with the amount sent by the allocators in the dictator game (Y) would indicate that the behavior is driven by an underlying altruistic tendency, rather than a response to the specific actions of the first movers in the trust game.

In the Berg Et Al