Consider the Following Two Games Taken from Cooper, DeJong, Forsyth

Consider the following two games taken from Cooper, DeJong, Forsyth and Ross's paper. In each game the two players have three strategies - 1, 2 and 3.
$\begin{array}{c}\begin{array}{lll}\\\\\\\\\\&1\\Player \#1&2\\&3\\\\\\\\\&1\\Player \#1& 2\\&3\end{array}\begin{array}{lll}\\\\Game 1\\Player \#2\\ 1\\350,350\\250,350\\0,700\\Game2\\Player \#2\\1\\350,350\\250,350\\0,1000\\\end{array}\begin{array}{l}\\\\\\\\\begin{array}{ll}2 & 3 \\350,250 & 700,0 \\550,550 & 1000,0 \\0,1000 & 600,600\end{array}\\\\\\\begin{array}{ll}2 & 3 \\350,250 & 1000,0 \\550,550 & 0,0 \\0,0 & 600,600\end{array}\end{array}\end{array}$
(a) What is (are) the Nash equilibrium/equilibria in Game 1 and Game 2? (b) Would you expect the outcomes in the two games to be similar or different? If different, then explain briefly, how they are different? (c) In discussing the outcomes of the two games, clearly relate your answer to the (i) concept of payoff dominance and (ii) the role of dominated strategies.