-Consider the reduced form of the Sink-the-Battleship Game depicted in Figure 6.4 where 1 designates a "hit" and 0 designates a "miss." The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for this game is:
I. {ABEC, IGDB}.
II. {ACEB, IHFC}.
III. {ABEC, IHFC}.
IV. {ACEB, IHFC}.
Which of the following is correct?
A) I only.
B) II only.
C) I and II only.
D) II and III only.
E) None of the above.

Question

-Consider the reduced form of the Sink-the-Battleship Game depicted in Figure 6.4 where 1 designates a "hit" and 0 designates a "miss." The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for this game is:
I. {ABEC, IGDB}.
II. {ACEB, IHFC}.
III. {ABEC, IHFC}.
IV. {ACEB, IHFC}.
Which of the following is correct?
A) I only. 
B) II only. 
C) I and II only. 
D) II and III only. 
E) None of the above.

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy is the best response to the other player's strategy, and no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. The correct answer depends on the specific payoffs and strategies available in the reduced form of the Sink-the-Battleship Game, which are not provided here. Without specific details about the strategies and payoffs, it's impossible to determine the correct Nash equilibria, hence the answer indicating that none of the provided options can be confirmed as correct without additional information.

-Consider the Reduced Form of the Sink-The-Battleship Game Depicted in Figure