-Consider again the multi stage-game in Figure 11.4 in which Homer moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:
A) {Bart 6 Lisa}
B) {Bart 6 Maggie}
C) {Lisa 6 Bart}
D) {Maggie 6 Maggie}
E) This game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Question

-Consider again the multi stage-game in Figure 11.4 in which Homer moves first. The subgame perfect equilibrium for this game is:
A) {Bart 6 Lisa} 
B) {Bart 6 Maggie} 
C) {Lisa 6 Bart} 
D) {Maggie 6 Maggie} 
E) This game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

In a subgame perfect equilibrium, each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players at every stage of the game. In this scenario, since Homer moves first, his optimal choice would lead to the path that maximizes his payoff considering the rational responses of the other players in subsequent moves. Without seeing Figure 11.4, we can infer that option B, {Bart 6 Maggie}, is identified as the correct answer based on the question's context, suggesting that Homer's initial move leads to an outcome where Bart and then Maggie are the best responses in this sequential game.

-Consider Again the Multi Stage-Game in Figure 11