Scenario: Consider the following non-cooperative, simultaneous-move game where each player knows her own and her opponent's payoffs. This game is called the dating dilemma. Hayley and Jack are a couple deciding what to do on a Saturday afternoon in the summer. Hayley wants to go to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), while Jack wants to go to a New York Mets game. Neither Jack nor Hayley will derive any benefit from going to their preferred activity without their partner. The payoff matrix for this game is presented below.

-Refer to the scenario above.Are there any Nash equilibria?
A) Yes, Hayley and Jack both choose to go to the Mets game
B) Yes, Hayley chooses to go to the MoMA and Jack chooses to go to the Mets game
C) Yes, Hayley and Jack both choose to go to the MoMA
D) (A) and (

Question

Scenario: Consider the following non-cooperative, simultaneous-move game where each player knows her own and her opponent's payoffs. This game is called the dating dilemma. Hayley and Jack are a couple deciding what to do on a Saturday afternoon in the summer. Hayley wants to go to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), while Jack wants to go to a New York Mets game. Neither Jack nor Hayley will derive any benefit from going to their preferred activity without their partner. The payoff matrix for this game is presented below.
 
-Refer to the scenario above.Are there any Nash equilibria?
A) Yes, Hayley and Jack both choose to go to the Mets game
B) Yes, Hayley chooses to go to the MoMA and Jack chooses to go to the Mets game
C) Yes, Hayley and Jack both choose to go to the MoMA
D) (A) and (

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

There are two Nash equilibria in this game: (1) both players choose to go to the Mets game and (2) both players choose to go to the MoMA. In the first equilibrium, neither player has an incentive to switch because they both receive a higher payoff by going to the Mets game with their partner than by going to the MoMA alone. In the second equilibrium, neither player has an incentive to switch because they both receive a higher payoff by going to the MoMA with their partner than by going to the Mets game alone. Therefore, both (A) and (C) are Nash equilibria.

Scenario: Consider the Following Non-Cooperative, Simultaneous-Move Game Where Each Player