Consider two Cournot competitors selling complementary goods with demand curves given by:
p₁ = 100 - q₁ + .5q₂
p₂ = 100 - q₂ + .5q₁
Suppose each firm has a marginal and average cost of $10.
a.What about the demand equations indicate that these goods are complements? How do they differ from the standard Cournot model?
b.Find the equilibrium prices and quantities.
c.Suppose the two firms merge.By doing so,the newly merged firm will act to maximize the joint profits ((q₁,q₂)= ₁(q₁,q₂)+ ₂(q₁,q₂)).Find the joint-profit maximizing price and quantities.
d.Are the combined profits greater or smaller from merging? That is,is merging profitable for the firms?
e.Are consumers better or worse off with the firms merging? How does this compare to the mergers of Cournot competitors selling substitutes? What does this imply about antitrust policy towards mergers of firms selling complementary goods (such as airplanes and engines,computers and processors,cars and tire companies,etc).
Correct Answer:
Verified
View Answer
Unlock this answer now
Get Access to more Verified Answers free of charge
Q82: Q85: Assuming a homogeneous product,the Bertrand duopoly equilibrium Q86: In a Bertrand model,market power is a Q91: In a Bertrand model,graphically,the intersection of all Q95: The Bertrand model of price setting assumes Q96: Assuming a homogeneous product,the Bertrand equilibrium price Q96: Suppose the demand for Pepsi is qp Q101: In a Bertrand model with differentiated products, Q106: Product differentiation Q119: Product differentiation allows a firm to charge![]()
A)
A) may allow firms to price
Unlock this Answer For Free Now!
View this answer and more for free by performing one of the following actions
Scan the QR code to install the App and get 2 free unlocks
Unlock quizzes for free by uploading documents