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Table 12.3 Payoffs to Villager 1 and Villager 2 in a Road

Question 25

Multiple Choice

Table 12.3
Payoffs to Villager 1 and Villager 2 in a Road Maintenance Game
(R is the benefits of a maintained road and the project requires a total of L hours of labor,therefore R-L/2>0 is the net utility payoff)

Table 12.3 Payoffs to Villager 1 and Villager 2 in a Road Maintenance Game (R is the benefits of a maintained road and the project requires a total of L hours of labor,therefore R-L/2>0 is the net utility payoff)     -According to table 12.3,what is the Nash equilibrium if this game is non-cooperative? A)  Villager 1 chooses shirking,Villager 2 chooses shirking. B)  Villager 1 chooses shirking,Villager 2 chooses participating. C)  Villager 1 chooses participating,Villager 2 chooses shirking. D)  Villager 1 chooses participating,Villager 2 chooses participating.
-According to table 12.3,what is the Nash equilibrium if this game is non-cooperative?


A) Villager 1 chooses shirking,Villager 2 chooses shirking.
B) Villager 1 chooses shirking,Villager 2 chooses participating.
C) Villager 1 chooses participating,Villager 2 chooses shirking.
D) Villager 1 chooses participating,Villager 2 chooses participating.

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