Employers can reduce the incentive of imperfectly monitored workers to shirk by:
A) better monitoring
B) lower wages
C) avoiding year-end bonuses
D) none of the above
Correct Answer:
Verified
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A)agent performs
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A)agent tends
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A)have perfect information about how
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