The cost,c,of a college education that serves only as a signal of a high-quality worker is $20,000.The wage of a known high-quality worker,wh,is $75,000.The wage for a known low-quality worker,w1,is $50,000.For what value of the share of the work force that is of high quality,t,is a pooling equilibrium possible?
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