Figure 17-6 Figure 17-6 Shows Two Different Compensation Schemes

Figure 17-6 Figure 17-6 shows two different compensation schemes for the Safelite Glass Corporation, an installer of auto glass windshields. Under Scheme I, the firm pays a consistent wage of $80 per day based on an 8-hour workday. Q_min represents the cut-off point under the hourly-wage system: if a worker installed fewer than Q_min windshields, the worker got fired. Scheme II represents a piece-rate scheme with an earnings floor: no worker would get less than $80 per day (for an 8-hour workday) and would have to produce at least Q_min. For any output level beyond Q* the worker earned an additional $20 for each unit produced.
-Refer to Figure 17-6.Under Scheme I

A) workers compete with each other to see who can produce beyond Q_min in the shortest possible time.
B) workers have no incentive to produce beyond Q_min.
C) workers signal their productivity to the firm by consistently producing above Q_min.
D) the incentive to increase productivity depends on where Q_min is set; if it is at a very high level, then workers will rise to the challenge for fear of losing their jobs.