Consider the following preference table for two voters: $\begin{array} { l l l }
\text { First choice } & \text { D } & \text { B } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { C } & \text { A } \
\text { Third choice } & B & \text { C } \
\text { Fourth choice } & \text { A } & \text { D }
\end{array}$
If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the left manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit?

Question

Consider the following preference table for two voters: $\begin{array} { l l l } 
\text { First choice } & \text { D } & \text { B } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { C } & \text { A } \
\text { Third choice } & B & \text { C } \
\text { Fourth choice } & \text { A } & \text { D }
\end{array}$ 
If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the left manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The Borda count assigns points to each choice based on their rank. In this case, D gets 3 points, B gets 2 points, C gets 1 point, and A gets 0 points. If the left voter switches their first and third choices, the points would now be: B 3 points, D 2 points, C 1 point, and A 0 points. This would result in B winning instead of D. Therefore, the left voter can manipulate the outcome to their benefit through strategic ranking of their choices.

Consider the Following Preference Table for Two Voters If a Borda Count Is Used, Can the Voter on l