Consider the following preference table for two voters: $$\begin{array} { l l l }
\text { First choice } & \text { C } & \text { A } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { D } & \text { B } \
\text { Third choice } & \text { B } & \text { C } \
\text { Fourth choice } & \text { A } & \text { D }
\end{array}$$ If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the right manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit with no ties for the winner?

Question

Consider the following preference table for two voters: $$\begin{array} { l l l } 
\text { First choice } & \text { C } & \text { A } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { D } & \text { B } \
\text { Third choice } & \text { B } & \text { C } \
\text { Fourth choice } & \text { A } & \text { D }
\end{array}$$ If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the right manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit with no ties for the winner?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The voter on the right can manipulate the outcome by ranking C as his or her first choice, D as his or her second choice, A as his or her third choice, and B as his or her fourth choice. This will result in a Borda count of 12 for C, 10 for D, 8 for A, and 6 for B, giving C the win.

Consider the Following Preference Table for Two Voters If a Borda Count Is Used, Can the Voter on l