Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken." There are two possible strategies, Swerve and Drive Straight.A player who chooses to Swerve is called "chicken" and gets a payoff of zero, regardless of what the other player does.A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payoff of 84 if the other player Swerves and a payoff of -36 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight.This game has two pure strategy equilibria and
A)a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.30 and drives straight with probability 0.70.
B)two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight.
C)a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.30 and the other swerves with probability 0.70.
D)a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.15 and drives straight with probability 0.85.
E)no mixed strategies.

Question

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

CIn a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for a game like "chicken," each player randomizes over their strategies in such a way that makes the other player indifferent between their own strategies. The probabilities given in choices A and C allow for such a scenario, where the expected payoffs from swerving and driving straight can be equalized for both players, depending on the specific payoffs of the game.

Two Players Are Engaged in a Game of "Chicken