In a sealed-bid auction with private values drawn independently from a common distribution, each buyer's equilibrium bid is set equal to:
A) his reservation price.
B) the expected reservation price of the other bidders.
C) the expectation of the third-highest buyer value.
D) the expectation of the second-highest buyer value.
E) the expectation of the next-highest buyer value conditional on it being smaller than the bidder's value.
Correct Answer:
Verified
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