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Business
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Globale Microeconomics
Quiz 20: Contracts and Moral Hazards
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Question 81
Multiple Choice
If a firm was owned by its employees,
Question 82
Multiple Choice
Workers can reduce the chance of an employer lying by
Question 83
Essay
Suppose the probability of an employee being caught shirking, q, is a function of the employer's monitoring, M, such that q = M/100. If workers must put up a $1,000 bond and the gain to each worker from shirking is $100, what is the employer's optimal level of monitoring that is just sufficient to discourage shirking?
Question 84
Multiple Choice
Why would a firm knowingly hire lazy employees?
Question 85
Multiple Choice
If a firm hires lazy employees,
Question 86
Multiple Choice
A good salesperson can sell $1,000,000 worth of goods, while a poor one can sell only $100,000 worth of goods. Job applicants know if they are good or bad, but the firm does not. A firm will offer job applicants a choice between a fixed salary and a 20% commission. Assuming risk-neutral salespersons and no opportunistic behavior, what level must the fixed salary be so that the firm can determine a prospective good salesperson from a poor one?
Question 87
Multiple Choice
Firms that seek to avoid hiring lazy workers that assert they are hardworking are trying to avoid
Question 88
Multiple Choice
Socially inefficient outcomes are possible when
Question 89
Multiple Choice
If good salespeople are extremely risk averse, then a choice between a fixed-fee contract and a contingent contract
Question 90
True/False
Including an employee representative on the board of directors reduces the possibility of opportunistic employer behavior.
Question 91
Multiple Choice
A deferred payment scheme is more likely to be accepted by a worker if
Question 92
Essay
Suppose an employer has monitoring devices established so that the probability of an employee being caught while shirking is 0.2. If the gain to the employee from shirking is $1,000, how large a bond will deter shirking?