Question 1

If person 6 (revolutionary threshold = 5) from α has an unpleasant encounter with a government official and her revolutionary threshold is lowered to 4, what would happen now in the society α′ = {0, 1, 2, 4, 4, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10}?

Accepted Answer

The answer of If person 6 (revolutionary threshold = 5)...

Question 2

If instead of Person 6 undergoing a threshold shift, it was Person 4 (threshold = 4) from α who had an unpleasant encounter with a government official and whose threshold was lowered (to 3), what would happen in the society α′′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}?

Accepted Answer

If Person 4's threshold is lowered to 3, they will now be affected by the event that previously only affected Person 6 with a threshold of 5. This may lead Person 4 to publicly protest the opposition, which could trigger a cascading effect of others joining in the protest. Since everyone in the society now has a threshold lower than or equal to 4, except for Person 10, it is likely that all members of the society except for Person 10 will publicly protest the opposition, resulting in a revolutionary cascade.

Question 3

"Preference falsification" makes revolutions unpredictable and makes revolutions seem inevitable after they have occurred.

Accepted Answer

Preference falsification refers to the phenomenon where individuals publicly express opinions different from their true preferences in order to conform to social norms or avoid punishment. This can lead to a situation where people do not reveal their true dissatisfaction with the status quo, making it difficult to predict when a revolution might occur. However, once a revolution does occur, it can create a cascade effect where others feel more confident in expressing their true preferences, making the revolution seem inevitable in hindsight.

Question 4

The tipping, or threshold, models presented in Chapter 8 are used to explain why the public protests in Eastern Europe in 1989 were a surprise to most political observers, both inside and outside of Eastern Europe. According to the reading and lectures, why are revolutions always going to be a surprise?

Accepted Answer

The reading and lectures explain that revolutions are often a surprise because of preference falsification, where people publicly express support for the ruling regime while privately harboring dissent. This makes it difficult to gauge the true level of dissatisfaction within a population and predict when a revolution might occur.

Question 5

In which of the following societies would there be a revolutionary cascade (revolution), given the distribution of revolutionary thresholds shown in the examples below?

Accepted Answer

In a revolutionary cascade model, a revolution occurs when each individual's threshold (the number of people they need to see participating before they join) is met or exceeded. In option A, the cascade starts with the individual with a threshold of 0, followed by those with a threshold of 1, creating a domino effect that includes everyone. In option B, a similar cascade occurs, starting with the individual with a threshold of 0, then those with 1, and so on. However, in option C, the cascade stops with the individual with a threshold of 4 because there are not enough individuals participating before reaching someone with a higher threshold (5) than the number of participants up to that point (4). Thus, revolutions would occur only in (A) and (B) where the sequential thresholds allow for a continuous cascade.

Question 6

In which of the two societies below is a revolution more likely to occur?
Γ = {0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 10} δ = {0, 1, 1, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 10}

Accepted Answer

A revolution is more likely to occur in society γ because it has a higher level of inequality. Society γ has one individual who has significantly more wealth than the others, while society δ has a more equal distribution of wealth. High levels of inequality have been linked to political instability and social unrest, making society γ more prone to revolution.

Question 7

Collective action theory, which highlights the incentives for free riding, is better at explaining why:

Accepted Answer

Collective action theory explains why protests were rare due to the high incentives for individuals to free ride and avoid the costs of participating in protests, especially under repressive regimes.

Question 8

Democratic Transition Game
Consider the case that you are a soft-liner in an authoritarian regime who would like to introduce a policy of liberalization. Your goal is to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship, not to transition to democracy. You are a dictator, not a democrat!
1. If you open and civil society enters, then you achieve your objective of a Broadened Dictatorship.
2. If you open and civil society organizes, then you need to decide whether to democratize and become a full democracy or to repress.
3. A successful repression will lead to a narrow dictatorship, whereas an unsuccessful repression will lead to insurgency.
4. Repression is successful only if civil society is weak.
Figure 1
  
Figure 2
 
-The game tree in Figure 1, is associated with the game in which you are sure that civil society is WEAK. Solve the game by backward induction. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? (Note: write the equilibrium in the form [Soft-liner's 1st move, Soft-liner's 2nd move; Civil Society's move]).

Accepted Answer

Since the soft-liner knows civil society is weak, the best option is to open up and repress any attempts at civil society organizing. This leads to a narrow dictatorship, which achieves the soft-liner's objective of co-opting the opposition into a broadened dictatorship.

Question 9

Democratic Transition Game
Consider the case that you are a soft-liner in an authoritarian regime who would like to introduce a policy of liberalization. Your goal is to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship, not to transition to democracy. You are a dictator, not a democrat!
1. If you open and civil society enters, then you achieve your objective of a Broadened Dictatorship.
2. If you open and civil society organizes, then you need to decide whether to democratize and become a full democracy or to repress.
3. A successful repression will lead to a narrow dictatorship, whereas an unsuccessful repression will lead to insurgency.
4. Repression is successful only if civil society is weak.
Figure 1
  
Figure 2
 
-What is the outcome of the game shown in Figure 1?

Accepted Answer

According to Figure 1, if the dictator opens up, civil society will enter and the dictator will achieve their objective of a broadened dictatorship. This is the best choice for the dictator as it meets their goals without risking a potential transition to democracy or facing insurgency from civil society.

Question 10

Democratic Transition Game
Consider the case that you are a soft-liner in an authoritarian regime who would like to introduce a policy of liberalization. Your goal is to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship, not to transition to democracy. You are a dictator, not a democrat!
1. If you open and civil society enters, then you achieve your objective of a Broadened Dictatorship.
2. If you open and civil society organizes, then you need to decide whether to democratize and become a full democracy or to repress.
3. A successful repression will lead to a narrow dictatorship, whereas an unsuccessful repression will lead to insurgency.
4. Repression is successful only if civil society is weak.
Figure 1
  
Figure 2
 
-The game tree in Figure 2, is associated with the game in which you are sure that civil society is STRONG. Solve the game by backward induction. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?

Accepted Answer

Backward induction involves solving the game from the end to the beginning. Given that civil society is strong, the optimal strategy for the government is to democratize if civil society organizes, as repression would lead to a worse outcome. Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is "Do nothing, Democratize; Organize."

Question 11

Democratic Transition Game
Consider the case that you are a soft-liner in an authoritarian regime who would like to introduce a policy of liberalization. Your goal is to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship, not to transition to democracy. You are a dictator, not a democrat!
1. If you open and civil society enters, then you achieve your objective of a Broadened Dictatorship.
2. If you open and civil society organizes, then you need to decide whether to democratize and become a full democracy or to repress.
3. A successful repression will lead to a narrow dictatorship, whereas an unsuccessful repression will lead to insurgency.
4. Repression is successful only if civil society is weak.
Figure 1
  
Figure 2
 
-What is the outcome of the game shown in Figure 2?

Accepted Answer

The outcome of the game shown in Figure 2 is status quo. This is because the incumbent dictator has a majority of the power and is able to maintain his position.

Question 12

Democratic Transition Game
Consider the case that you are a soft-liner in an authoritarian regime who would like to introduce a policy of liberalization. Your goal is to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship, not to transition to democracy. You are a dictator, not a democrat!
1. If you open and civil society enters, then you achieve your objective of a Broadened Dictatorship.
2. If you open and civil society organizes, then you need to decide whether to democratize and become a full democracy or to repress.
3. A successful repression will lead to a narrow dictatorship, whereas an unsuccessful repression will lead to insurgency.
4. Repression is successful only if civil society is weak.
Figure 1
  
Figure 2
 
-Based on your answers to questions about the outcomes of the games shown in Figures 1 and 2 , is it possible to get a transition to democracy in a situation with complete information?

Accepted Answer

The goal of the soft-liner is not to transition to democracy, but to co-opt the opposition into a broadened dictatorship. In Figure 1, opening leads to civil society entering and achieving the objective of a broadened dictatorship. In Figure 2, opening leads to civil society organizing, which presents the soft-liner with the choice of either democratizing or repressing. Thus, in both cases, the objective is not to transition to democracy. Therefore, it is not possible to get a transition to democracy in a situation with complete information as the soft-liner's goal is to maintain a dictatorship.

Question 13

When dictators liberalize in an attempt to co-opt opposition groups, they are trying to strengthen their hold on power. If they miscalculate and assume that the opposition is weak when in fact it is strong, their liberalizing attempts might embolden the opposition groups and eventually lead to a democratic transition. But if the opposition group is actually weak, and the dictator mistakenly thinks it is strong, then the dictator will not dare to liberalize in the first place, which is unfortunate for civil society whose members could have benefited from the liberalization. If you were a member of the opposition (civil society) and you were interested in a transition to democracy, or at least a liberalization of the regime, would you be better off in the situation in which the dictator (liberalizers) knew for sure the exact strength of civil society, or in the situation in which the dictator was uncertain whether civil society was strong or not?

Accepted Answer

If the opposition is weak, they would prefer certainty as the dictator is more likely to liberalize in order to co-opt them, while uncertainty might lead to the dictator not initiating any liberalization. However, if the opposition is strong, they would prefer uncertainty as the dictator might be more cautious and hesitant to crack down on them if they believe the opposition is stronger than it actually is. This could create opportunities for the opposition to grow stronger and eventually push for democratic reforms. Therefore, it would depend on the strength of the opposition as to whether they would prefer certainty or uncertainty.

Question 14

If leaders try to "broaden" their dictatorship by institutionalizing it (with a legislature, elections, political parties, and so on), does it follow that their regime will be more stable?

Accepted Answer

Institutionalization can help stabilize a regime, but it is not a guarantee. The strength of the opposition is a crucial factor in determining the stability of a dictatorship. If the opposition is weak, institutionalizing the dictatorship may further strengthen the regime. However, if the opposition is strong, institutionalization may only serve to increase the avenues for opposition and destabilize the regime.

Question 15

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
 
-Solve the subgame on the left, where the Religious Party is moderate, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Note: write the equilibrium in the form (Regime's move; Moderate party's move).

Accepted Answer

If the Regime cancels the elections, they retain power as a dictatorship, but they do not know whether they are facing a moderate or radical Religious Party. If they hold the elections and the Religious Party is moderate, it will pursue a moderate policy and support democratic consolidation, which is the Regime's preferred outcome. If the Religious Party is radical, the Regime would have been better off canceling the elections, but once the elections are held, the moderate policy is still the best outcome for the Regime. Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (Hold elections; Pursue moderate policy).

Question 16

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
 
-Now that you have solved the subgame on the left, what is the outcome of this subgame?

Accepted Answer

In the subgame on the left, the Religious Party, whether moderate or radical, will choose to pursue democratic consolidation because the payoff for this outcome is higher than the payoff for a new religious dictatorship. Therefore, the Regime should hold the elections, as the outcome will likely be democratic consolidation rather than a new dictatorship.

Question 17

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
 
-Solve the subgame on the right, where the Religious Party is radical, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Note: write the equilibrium in the form (Regime's move; Radical Party's move).

Accepted Answer

In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the Regime will choose to cancel elections to prevent the Radical Party from pursuing a radical policy, which is their preferred outcome. The Radical Party, being radical, will pursue a radical policy when given the chance. Thus, the equilibrium is (Cancel elections; Pursue radical policy).

Question 18

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
 
-Now that you have solved the subgame on the right, what is the outcome of this subgame?

Accepted Answer

The outcome of a subgame that leads to "continued dictatorship" suggests that the dynamics within the game do not change significantly enough to alter the authoritarian regime's hold on power, hence maintaining the status quo.

Question 19

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
 
-What is the expected payoff to the Regime from choosing to cancel elections?

Accepted Answer

The expected payoff to the Regime from choosing to cancel the elections is 20. In this scenario, the Regime would retain power as a dictatorship and avoid the potentially disastrous outcome of a religious dictatorship coming to power.

The best choice for the Religious Party depends on its type. If the Religious Party is moderate, the best choice is to support democratic consolidation, as this leads to the highest payoff for both parties (10 for the Regime and 15 for the Religious Party). If the Religious Party is radical, the best choice is to create a religious dictatorship, as this leads to the highest payoff for the Radical Religious Party (20) but the lowest payoff for the Regime (0).

Question 20

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections). The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen), then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
 
-What is the expected payoff to the Regime from choosing to hold elections?

Accepted Answer

If the Regime holds elections, they can either get a payoff of 5 if the Religious Party turns out to be moderate and democratic consolidation is achieved, or a payoff of 25p if the Religious Party turns out to be radical and they establish a religious dictatorship. Therefore, the expected payoff to the Regime is (5 + 25p)/2 = 5 + 20p. Choosing to hold elections is the best choice for the Regime if 5 + 20p is greater than or equal to the payoff they would get from continuing the dictatorship, which is 10. Solving for p in the inequality 5 + 20p ≥ 10 gives p ≥ 1/2. Therefore, the Regime should hold elections if they believe that there is at least a 50% chance that the Religious Party is moderate.

Quiz 7: Democratic Transitions

If person 6 (revolutionary threshold = 5) from α has an unpleasant encounter with a government official and her revolutionary threshold is lowered to 4, what would happen now in the society α′ = {0, 1, 2, 4, 4, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10}?

If instead of Person 6 undergoing a threshold shift, it was Person 4 (threshold = 4) from α who had an unpleasant encounter with a government official and whose threshold was lowered (to 3) , what would happen in the society α′′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}?

"Preference falsification" makes revolutions unpredictable and makes revolutions seem inevitable after they have occurred.

In which of the following societies would there be a revolutionary cascade (revolution) , given the distribution of revolutionary thresholds shown in the examples below?

In which of the two societies below is a revolution more likely to occur? Γ = {0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 10} δ = {0, 1, 1, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 10}

Collective action theory, which highlights the incentives for free riding, is better at explaining why:

If leaders try to "broaden" their dictatorship by institutionalizing it (with a legislature, elections, political parties, and so on) , does it follow that their regime will be more stable?