Passage
Jorge Luis Borges' 1946 short story "On Exactitude in Science" plays with the well-known aphorism, "The map is not the territory." In this paragraph-long fable, an empire's ambitious cartographers produce a map so spectacularly isomorphic it corresponds precisely in scale and detail with the kingdom it represents. Perfect yet useless, the map is virtually indistinguishable from the landscape until it begins to decay. In a 1981 treatise, Simulacra and Simulation, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard cites Borges' tale as "the finest allegory" of his own provocative proposition that, in the current era, we have lost the ability to distinguish between reality and its representation. Thus, Baudrillard-known as an extreme cultural relativist and often mocked as "the high priest of postmodernism"-postulates that "it is no longer a question of either maps or territories"; rather, "[s]omething has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between one and the other," that, he laments, once "constituted the charm of abstraction." Indeed, our postmodernist world is saturated with signs, symbols, and images that are never neutral or transparent but, by mediating reality, come to construct it. Consequently, in a sinister twist on the story, Baudrillard can assert that "today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the map." As he elaborates, "[T]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it." Instead, "[i]t is…the map that precedes the territory…that engenders the territory." In other words, representation can be seen to precede, produce, and ultimately surpass reality.But how can a copy be the antecedent of an original? How does an image become so alienated from reality? In Baudrillard's scheme, signs are subject to degeneration. Initially, a sign reflects reality, substituting for an original; like a carefully crafted counterfeit, it is a faithful but identifiable copy. In the next stage, the sign devolves into a less faithful copy of the original, thus distorting what it represents and masking reality. In its penultimate phase, the representation no longer pretends to be the original but now instead pretends to be a copy; hence, it masks an absence of reality and erodes the distinction between the real and representation. For instance, when images are mass produced, they propagate, taking on a life of their own and diminishing the authoritative aura of the original. In the final stage of the sign's devolution, it can claim "no relation to any reality whatsoever"; it no longer reflects or refers to reality but instead signifies nothing but signification. It has become a pure simulation, a suspiciously specious semblance Baudrillard calls the simulacrum.In Baudrillardian theory, when the distinction between representation and reality, sign and referent, original and reproduction disintegrates, the real disappears; we are left with copies of copies that no longer have-or never had-an original. What remains, then, is a "hyperreality" of simulacra and simulation. So, Baudrillard maintains, "[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or substance.... It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody." It is instead a question of substitution, of "substituting the signs of the real for the real." As one writer describes it, "The simulation is no longer a reflection of reality, nor a reference to it, but a creation of a new real by models that are not based on reality." This new real may be genetically engineered, as with cloning, or possibly computer generated. Even something as essential as currency has been progressively replaced, first by checks and then by credit and debit cards, until finally only numbers, divorced from any concrete reality, are exchanged on money transfer apps. Likewise, as reality dissolves into the hyperreality of simulacra, human experience devolves into "a simulation of reality."
-The author's central point regarding the existence of the universe is that:

Question

Passage
Jorge Luis Borges' 1946 short story "On Exactitude in Science" plays with the well-known aphorism, "The map is not the territory."  In this paragraph-long fable, an empire's ambitious cartographers produce a map so spectacularly isomorphic it corresponds precisely in scale and detail with the kingdom it represents.  Perfect yet useless, the map is virtually indistinguishable from the landscape until it begins to decay.  In a 1981 treatise, Simulacra and Simulation, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard cites Borges' tale as "the finest allegory" of his own provocative proposition that, in the current era, we have lost the ability to distinguish between reality and its representation.  Thus, Baudrillard-known as an extreme cultural relativist and often mocked as "the high priest of postmodernism"-postulates that "it is no longer a question of either maps or territories"; rather, "[s]omething has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between one and the other," that, he laments, once "constituted the charm of abstraction."  Indeed, our postmodernist world is saturated with signs, symbols, and images that are never neutral or transparent but, by mediating reality, come to construct it.  Consequently, in a sinister twist on the story, Baudrillard can assert that "today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the map."  As he elaborates, "[T]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it."  Instead, "[i]t is…the map that precedes the territory…that engenders the territory."  In other words, representation can be seen to precede, produce, and ultimately surpass reality.But how can a copy be the antecedent of an original?  How does an image become so alienated from reality?  In Baudrillard's scheme, signs are subject to degeneration.  Initially, a sign reflects reality, substituting for an original; like a carefully crafted counterfeit, it is a faithful but identifiable copy.  In the next stage, the sign devolves into a less faithful copy of the original, thus distorting what it represents and masking reality.  In its penultimate phase, the representation no longer pretends to be the original but now instead pretends to be a copy; hence, it masks an absence of reality and erodes the distinction between the real and representation.  For instance, when images are mass produced, they propagate, taking on a life of their own and diminishing the authoritative aura of the original.  In the final stage of the sign's devolution, it can claim "no relation to any reality whatsoever"; it no longer reflects or refers to reality but instead signifies nothing but signification.  It has become a pure simulation, a suspiciously specious semblance Baudrillard calls the simulacrum.In Baudrillardian theory, when the distinction between representation and reality, sign and referent, original and reproduction disintegrates, the real disappears; we are left with copies of copies that no longer have-or never had-an original.  What remains, then, is a "hyperreality" of simulacra and simulation.  So, Baudrillard maintains, "[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or substance....  It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody."  It is instead a question of substitution, of "substituting the signs of the real for the real."  As one writer describes it, "The simulation is no longer a reflection of reality, nor a reference to it, but a creation of a new real by models that are not based on reality."  This new real may be genetically engineered, as with cloning, or possibly computer generated.  Even something as essential as currency has been progressively replaced, first by checks and then by credit and debit cards, until finally only numbers, divorced from any concrete reality, are exchanged on money transfer apps.  Likewise, as reality dissolves into the hyperreality of simulacra, human experience devolves into "a simulation of reality."
-The author's central point regarding the existence of the universe is that:

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

Paragraph 3 warns against the "tendency to make scientific assertions from a perspective biased by human perception." The author then applies that warning to the idea that the universe has a purpose, arguing that "claims about the purpose of the universe rest on shaky ground. In particular, we must be wary of inferences drawn from juxtaposing the existence of intelligent life with the improbable cosmological conditions that make such life possible" (Paragraph 4). This theme is emphasized throughout the remainder of the passage. For instance, Paragraph 5 asserts that "it is tempting to draw deep cosmological, teleological, and even theological conclusions" based on the idea that the existence of life was highly unlikely to occur by chance. The author argues that "no such conclusions follow" because if a life-sustaining universe did not exist, then "there would be no one to wonder why a life-sustaining universe exists. This fact is a function not of purpose, but of pre-requisite." In other words, the author asserts that the improbability of life existing is irrelevant to the question of whether life has a purpose, because it is only when life does exist that such a question can even be asked. Accordingly, the author concludes that "the seemingly low initial chance that such a universe would exist is not in itself indicative of a purpose to its existence" (Paragraph 6). Therefore, his or her central point regarding the existence of the universe is that facts about the universe do not justify inferences about its purpose. (Choice B) the initial conditions of the universe should guide how we understand other facts about it. Paragraph 6 asserts that "the seemingly low initial chance that such a universe would exist is not in itself indicative of a purpose to its existence." Therefore, the author takes the view that the initial conditions of the universe should not guide how we understand other facts about it. (Choice C) facts about the universe are inevitably framed by biases of human perception. Paragraph 3 asserts that "the difference between for all we know and what is remains crucially important, because it forestalls a tendency to make scientific assertions from a perspective biased by human perception." Accordingly, although the author implies that humans have a tendency toward biased perception, he or she indicates that this tendency can be forestalled (prevented). Consequently, the author implies that facts about the universe are not inevitably framed by biases of human perception. (Choice D) facts about the universe depend on a subjective understanding of probability. Paragraph 1 describes "a conceptual confusion between objective probability and subjective probability" that "leads to an erroneous conflation (ie, a mistaken mix) of genuine possibility with what is in fact merely personal ignorance of outcome." Therefore, the author indicates that a subjective understanding of probability leads to error in one's understanding of facts.

Passage Jorge Luis Borges' 1946 Short Story "On Exactitude in Science