Passage
Jorge Luis Borges' 1946 short story "On Exactitude in Science" plays with the well-known aphorism, "The map is not the territory." In this paragraph-long fable, an empire's ambitious cartographers produce a map so spectacularly isomorphic it corresponds precisely in scale and detail with the kingdom it represents. Perfect yet useless, the map is virtually indistinguishable from the landscape until it begins to decay. In a 1981 treatise, Simulacra and Simulation, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard cites Borges' tale as "the finest allegory" of his own provocative proposition that, in the current era, we have lost the ability to distinguish between reality and its representation. Thus, Baudrillard-known as an extreme cultural relativist and often mocked as "the high priest of postmodernism"-postulates that "it is no longer a question of either maps or territories"; rather, "[s]omething has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between one and the other," that, he laments, once "constituted the charm of abstraction." Indeed, our postmodernist world is saturated with signs, symbols, and images that are never neutral or transparent but, by mediating reality, come to construct it. Consequently, in a sinister twist on the story, Baudrillard can assert that "today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the map." As he elaborates, "[T]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it." Instead, "[i]t is…the map that precedes the territory…that engenders the territory." In other words, representation can be seen to precede, produce, and ultimately surpass reality.But how can a copy be the antecedent of an original? How does an image become so alienated from reality? In Baudrillard's scheme, signs are subject to degeneration. Initially, a sign reflects reality, substituting for an original; like a carefully crafted counterfeit, it is a faithful but identifiable copy. In the next stage, the sign devolves into a less faithful copy of the original, thus distorting what it represents and masking reality. In its penultimate phase, the representation no longer pretends to be the original but now instead pretends to be a copy; hence, it masks an absence of reality and erodes the distinction between the real and representation. For instance, when images are mass produced, they propagate, taking on a life of their own and diminishing the authoritative aura of the original. In the final stage of the sign's devolution, it can claim "no relation to any reality whatsoever"; it no longer reflects or refers to reality but instead signifies nothing but signification. It has become a pure simulation, a suspiciously specious semblance Baudrillard calls the simulacrum.In Baudrillardian theory, when the distinction between representation and reality, sign and referent, original and reproduction disintegrates, the real disappears; we are left with copies of copies that no longer have-or never had-an original. What remains, then, is a "hyperreality" of simulacra and simulation. So, Baudrillard maintains, "[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or substance.... It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody." It is instead a question of substitution, of "substituting the signs of the real for the real." As one writer describes it, "The simulation is no longer a reflection of reality, nor a reference to it, but a creation of a new real by models that are not based on reality." This new real may be genetically engineered, as with cloning, or possibly computer generated. Even something as essential as currency has been progressively replaced, first by checks and then by credit and debit cards, until finally only numbers, divorced from any concrete reality, are exchanged on money transfer apps. Likewise, as reality dissolves into the hyperreality of simulacra, human experience devolves into "a simulation of reality."
-Which of the following scenarios best exemplifies "a conceptual confusion between objective probability and subjective probability" (Paragraph 1), as the author describes it?

Question

Passage
Jorge Luis Borges' 1946 short story "On Exactitude in Science" plays with the well-known aphorism, "The map is not the territory."  In this paragraph-long fable, an empire's ambitious cartographers produce a map so spectacularly isomorphic it corresponds precisely in scale and detail with the kingdom it represents.  Perfect yet useless, the map is virtually indistinguishable from the landscape until it begins to decay.  In a 1981 treatise, Simulacra and Simulation, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard cites Borges' tale as "the finest allegory" of his own provocative proposition that, in the current era, we have lost the ability to distinguish between reality and its representation.  Thus, Baudrillard-known as an extreme cultural relativist and often mocked as "the high priest of postmodernism"-postulates that "it is no longer a question of either maps or territories"; rather, "[s]omething has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between one and the other," that, he laments, once "constituted the charm of abstraction."  Indeed, our postmodernist world is saturated with signs, symbols, and images that are never neutral or transparent but, by mediating reality, come to construct it.  Consequently, in a sinister twist on the story, Baudrillard can assert that "today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the map."  As he elaborates, "[T]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it."  Instead, "[i]t is…the map that precedes the territory…that engenders the territory."  In other words, representation can be seen to precede, produce, and ultimately surpass reality.But how can a copy be the antecedent of an original?  How does an image become so alienated from reality?  In Baudrillard's scheme, signs are subject to degeneration.  Initially, a sign reflects reality, substituting for an original; like a carefully crafted counterfeit, it is a faithful but identifiable copy.  In the next stage, the sign devolves into a less faithful copy of the original, thus distorting what it represents and masking reality.  In its penultimate phase, the representation no longer pretends to be the original but now instead pretends to be a copy; hence, it masks an absence of reality and erodes the distinction between the real and representation.  For instance, when images are mass produced, they propagate, taking on a life of their own and diminishing the authoritative aura of the original.  In the final stage of the sign's devolution, it can claim "no relation to any reality whatsoever"; it no longer reflects or refers to reality but instead signifies nothing but signification.  It has become a pure simulation, a suspiciously specious semblance Baudrillard calls the simulacrum.In Baudrillardian theory, when the distinction between representation and reality, sign and referent, original and reproduction disintegrates, the real disappears; we are left with copies of copies that no longer have-or never had-an original.  What remains, then, is a "hyperreality" of simulacra and simulation.  So, Baudrillard maintains, "[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or substance....  It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody."  It is instead a question of substitution, of "substituting the signs of the real for the real."  As one writer describes it, "The simulation is no longer a reflection of reality, nor a reference to it, but a creation of a new real by models that are not based on reality."  This new real may be genetically engineered, as with cloning, or possibly computer generated.  Even something as essential as currency has been progressively replaced, first by checks and then by credit and debit cards, until finally only numbers, divorced from any concrete reality, are exchanged on money transfer apps.  Likewise, as reality dissolves into the hyperreality of simulacra, human experience devolves into "a simulation of reality."
-Which of the following scenarios best exemplifies "a conceptual confusion between objective probability and subjective probability" (Paragraph 1), as the author describes it?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

Paragraph 1 discusses "a conceptual confusion between objective probability and subjective probability," specifying that this confusion consists in "an erroneous conflation (ie, a mistaken mix) of genuine possibility with what is in fact merely personal ignorance of outcome." Accordingly, someone who is confused in this way does not know the result of an event that has already occurred, and mistakenly treats that result as still a matter of chance rather than a matter of fact. For example, Paragraph 2 describes a situation in which "[a] standard die is rolled on a table, but the outcome of the roll is concealed." According to the author, "To say there is a one-in-six chance that a five was rolled implies there is an equal chance that any of the other numbers were rolled. But there is no equal chance, because the roll has already occurred." Although a person might subjectively think of that chance as 1/6, he or she would be incorrect because, objectively, "the probability that the result of the roll is a five is either 100% or 0%." Therefore, this type of confusion would be best exemplified by a scenario in which a law school graduate takes the bar exam, and while waiting for the results to be released she calculates how likely she is to pass. Although subjectively the applicant does not know her results, her ignorance does not change the fact that, objectively, she has already either succeeded or failed. Hence, whether she passed the bar exam has already been determined. By contrast, none of the following scenarios involves confusing one's lack of knowledge with an outcome remaining undetermined: A researcher approximates the starting values for a computer simulation on population growth, runs the simulation twice, and is surprised to receive very different ending values each time (Choice A). The researcher is not confused on account of ignorance of outcome. Rather, he or she is confused by the differences between two known outcomes of the simulation. A gambler counts the number of aces that have been dealt, determines how many are left in the deck, and then judges whether another ace will be dealt (Choice C). Although this scenario involves probability (ie, the chance that an ace will be dealt), the result of future deals has not yet been determined. Accordingly, the gambler's judgment does not treat an event that has already occurred as still a matter of chance. A hiker views a weather report predicting clear skies for the day, but when she is rained on during her hike, she realizes the meteorologist had been wrong (Choice D). The weather prediction was made in advance. Therefore, even though that prediction turned out to be incorrect, the meteorologist's error was not due to ignorance of an outcome that had already taken place.

Passage Jorge Luis Borges' 1946 Short Story "On Exactitude in Science