Question 1

Nagel claims that "If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the __________________________________, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that any physical theory of mind must be able to account for the subjective character of experience, which he claims is currently beyond the scope of any available conception. This is the main point he makes in his paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" which challenges the idea that a purely objective, physical explanation of consciousness is possible.

Question 2

According to Nagel, "Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences having _____________ character at all."

Accepted Answer

The answer of According to Nagel, "Very little work has...

Question 3

Theories that attempt to reduce mental events to physical events are called apocryphal.

Accepted Answer

Theories that attempt to reduce mental events to physical events are called physicalist or reductionist, not apocryphal. "Apocryphal" refers to something that is of doubtful authenticity or origin.

Question 4

Nagel claims that "Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that consciousness adds a level of complexity and mystery to the mind-body problem. Without consciousness, the problem becomes much simpler and more straightforward. However, with consciousness, it becomes almost impossible to fully understand the relationship between the mind and the body.

Question 5

Nagel says of consciousness, "No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that consciousness is a universal and fundamental feature of the universe that exists in countless forms, even in organisms on other planets. He also argues that the essence of consciousness is subjective experience, and that any organism that has consciousness must have some sort of subjective experience or "something it is like to be" that organism.

Question 6

Nagel says, "It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their external inconsistency. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness."

Accepted Answer

The answer of Nagel says, "It is useless to base...

Question 7

Nagel says, "Let me first try to state the issue somewhat more fully than by referring to the relation between the structure and the formalism, or between the pour-soi [for-itself] and the en-soi [in-itself]."

Accepted Answer

This quote does not accurately represent Thomas Nagel's philosophical focus or terminology. Nagel is known for his work in philosophy of mind, ethics, and epistemology, rather than existentialist terminology like "pour-soi" and "en-soi," which are associated with Jean-Paul Sartre.

Question 8

Nagel says, "Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that there are aspects of the subjective experience of being a bat that cannot be fully captured or comprehended by human language or cognitive capacities. This suggests the existence of non-linguistic facts or perspectives that we may not be able to fully access or understand.

Question 9

According to Nagel, "If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from rigid designators, then any shift to greater objectivity-that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint-does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that the subjective character of experience is something that cannot be fully understood through objective, scientific means or rigid designators. He suggests that moving towards a more objective viewpoint (less attached to a specific viewpoint) actually moves us away from understanding the true nature of subjective experiences. The statement misrepresents his view by suggesting he ties understanding solely to the use of rigid designators.

Question 10

Nagel claims that "If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that the subjective character of experience is a significant aspect of the mind that a physical theory must account for. However, he contends that no existing theory or concept is capable of explaining this aspect, leading him to propose a more neutral perspective towards this issue.

Question 11

According to Nagel, "Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences having an objective character at all."

Accepted Answer

Nagel argues that the question of whether objective character can be attributed to experiences has received very little attention.

Question 12

What does Nagel mean when he says, "Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them"?

Accepted Answer

The answer of What does Nagel mean when he says,...

Question 13

Nagel claims that "If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done." What reasons does Nagel give for this claim?

Accepted Answer

The answer of Nagel claims that "If we acknowledge that...

Question 14

Explain what Nagel means when he says, "Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences having an objective character at all."

Accepted Answer

The answer of Explain what Nagel means when he says,...

Question 15

Nagel says of consciousness, "No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism." Explain what Nagel means by the phrase "there is something it is like to be that organism."

Accepted Answer

The answer of Nagel says of consciousness, "No doubt it...

Question 16

Explain what Nagel means when he says, "It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness."

Accepted Answer

The answer of Explain what Nagel means when he says,...

Question 17

Churchland says that some philosophers have labeled the problem of trying to explain consciousness or conscious experience the ...

Accepted Answer

Churchland states that philosophers have labeled the problem of trying to explain consciousness or conscious experience the "Hard Problem."

Question 18

According to Churchland, "problems such as the nature of short-term memory, long-term memory, autobiographical memory, the nature of representation, the nature of sensory-motor integration, top-down effects in perception-not to mention such capacities as attention, depth perception, intelligent eye movement, skill acquisition, planning, decision-making, and so forth," are the so-called ...

Accepted Answer

Churchland refers to these as "Easy Problems" because they are considered to be solvable through cognitive science and neuroscience, unlike the "Hard Problem" of consciousness which involves explaining subjective experience.

Question 19

The features of consciousness; for example, what it is like to taste ice cream, or to feel pain, are called ...

Accepted Answer

The features of consciousness such as what it is like to taste ice cream, or to feel pain, are known as qualia. Qualia are subjective experiences that cannot be captured by objective measurements or descriptions.

Question 20

Churchland asks us to consider the following question: "What exactly is the evidence that we could explain all the 'Easy' phenomena and still not understand the neural mechanisms for ..."

Accepted Answer

Churchland is specifically discussing the phenomenon of consciousness and how it may be more complex and difficult to understand than other "Easy" phenomena that can be explained by neural mechanisms.

Quiz 5: René Descartes Mind and Body