Question 1

Table 6: Distribution of Attributes in a Hypothetical Los Angeles Community

$\begin{array}{l|llll}
\hline & \begin{array}{l}
\text { English } \
(\%)
\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}
\text { speaking } \
(\%)
\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}
\text { Spanish speaking } \
(\%)
\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}
\text { Korean speaking } \
(\%)
\end{array} \
\hline \text { Latino } & 20 & 31 & 0 \
\text { Asian } & 17 & 0 & 14 \
\text { Black } & 10 & 0 & 0 \
\text { White } & 8 & 0 & 0
\end{array}$ Let's assume that in order to win political office in this Los Angeles community, a candidate needs to win at least 50% of the vote. Let's also assume that political entrepreneurs will try to mobilize voters along either racial or linguistic lines, using the existing identity categories listed above.
-In the previous questions, you should have found that there were two identity categories that form minimal winning coalitions. Are there any groups of individuals that are members of both minimal winning coalitions? If so, who are they?

Accepted Answer

English-speaking Latinos are members of both minimal winning coalitions, as they are included in both the racial (Latino) and linguistic (English-speaking) categories that could form a coalition to surpass the 50% threshold.

Question 2

When we talk about "district magnitude" we are referring to:

Accepted Answer

The answer of When we talk about "district magnitude" we...

Question 3

The mechanical effect of an electoral system refers to the way that votes are translated into seats.

Accepted Answer

The statement is true. The mechanical effect of an electoral system refers to how votes are converted into seats in a particular government.

Question 4

In disproportional electoral systems, the mechanical effect rewards large parties and punishes small ones.

Accepted Answer

Disproportional electoral systems typically favor larger parties, as they are more likely to win a higher number of seats than their actual vote share would suggest, while smaller parties may struggle to gain representation or have their votes "wasted" in certain districts. This can create a situation where dominant parties or coalitions hold a significant advantage in the political system.

Question 5

The existence of the mechanical effect of electoral systems creates an incentive for voters and elites to behave strategically.

Accepted Answer

The mechanical effect of electoral systems refers to how the electoral rules and procedures affect the distribution of seats and votes. This can create strategic incentives for both voters and elites to try to manipulate the system to their advantage, such as by strategic voting, party coalitions, gerrymandering, and candidate selection. Therefore, the statement is true.

Question 6

Is the incentive to vote strategically higher or lower when the district magnitude is large?

Accepted Answer

When the district magnitude is large, there are more seats available, which reduces the impact of an individual vote. Therefore, the incentive to vote strategically is lower since the effect of one vote is diluted in a larger pool of seats.

Question 7

No electoral rules allow a perfectly proportional transfer from votes into seats, although some electoral systems are much more proportional than others.

Accepted Answer

Electoral systems such as proportional representation aim to be as proportional as possible but there are often factors that affect the accuracy of the translation from votes to seats such as the size of electoral districts or the allocation of surplus votes. Therefore, no electoral rules allow a perfectly proportional transfer from votes into seats.

Question 8

Why do electoral rules affect how many parties a country has?

Accepted Answer

Electoral rules can have mechanical effects that can incentivize strategic voting and strategic entry, ultimately affecting the number of parties in a country's political system. Thus, all of the given options play a role in how electoral rules impact the number of parties.

Question 9

What is the connection between district magnitude and the permissiveness of an electoral system?

Accepted Answer

When district magnitude (the number of representatives elected from each district) is high, it is more permissive because there is a greater chance for smaller parties to win seats. In contrast, when district magnitude is low, there are fewer opportunities for smaller parties to gain representation, making the system less permissive. Therefore, a higher district magnitude allows for a more permissive electoral system.

Question 10

France has recently banned people from covering their faces in public, which was widely understood to target Muslim women from wearing full-face veils. This indicates that the ______ cleavage is still salient in France.

Accepted Answer

The ban on covering faces in public in France is mainly based on the secular-clerical cleavage, which refers to the tension between proponents of secularism and those who advocate for the influence of religion in public life. The ban is seen as a way to protect French secularism and prevent the integration of religious symbols into public spaces. This issue is not related to urban-rural, confessional or class cleavages.

Question 11

According to Duverger's theory, when are you likely to see many parties in a country?

Accepted Answer

Duverger's theory states that a proportional representation electoral system tends to produce a multiplicity of parties, while a plurality system tends to favor a two-party system. However, the number of parties can be further increased if a country has many politically salient cleavages (such as ethnic or religious divisions) and uses a proportional representation system. Therefore, the correct answer is D: when the country has many politically salient cleavages and the electoral system is proportional.

Question 12

The results of empirical tests of Duverger's theory show that increasing ethnic heterogeneity always leads to more legislative parties, regardless of the permissiveness of the electoral system.

Accepted Answer

Empirical tests have shown that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and number of legislative parties is complex and can be influenced by factors such as the permissiveness of the electoral system, the size of the ethnic groups, and the level of social integration. While ethnic heterogeneity can increase the number of parties, it does not always do so.

Question 13

Nonpermissive electoral systems (such as single-member district plurality) are thought to benefit a small number of large parties because:

Accepted Answer

All three options listed - the mechanical effect on translating votes into seats, incentives for strategic voting, and incentives for strategic entry - contribute to the advantage that larger parties have under nonpermissive electoral systems like single-member district plurality.

Question 14

Duverger's theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society (few cleavages) uses permissive electoral rules, then it will have many parties.

Accepted Answer

Duverger's theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society uses permissive electoral rules, then it will have a two-party system. Many parties are more likely to occur in countries with heterogeneous societies and strict electoral rules.

Question 15

Duverger's theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society (few cleavages) uses disproportional electoral rules, then it will have many parties.

Accepted Answer

Duverger's theory actually predicts that if a country with a heterogeneous society (many cleavages) uses disproportional electoral rules, then it will have many parties. If a country with a homogeneous society uses disproportional electoral rules, it may still have a two-party system due to factors such as regional differences or historical political divisions.

Question 16

According to the logic of Duverger's theory, if a country with a heterogeneous society (many cleavages) like Israel switched from its current permissive electoral rules to a disproportional system (such as the one the United States uses), what would you expect to happen to its party system?

Accepted Answer

Duverger's theory suggests that a disproportional electoral system will favor larger parties and discourage smaller parties. In a heterogeneous society like Israel, with many cleavages, multiple smaller parties are likely to emerge to represent different interests and demographics. Therefore, if Israel were to switch to a disproportional system, many of these smaller parties would likely be unable to meet the minimum threshold needed to win seats in the legislature, and larger parties would dominate. This would result in a decrease in the number of parties in the legislature.

Question 17

According to the logic of Duverger's theory, if the United States changed its electoral rules and adopted a permissive form of PR (with large district magnitudes), what do you predict would happen? (You should assume that the United States has a fairly heterogeneous society-i.e., many cleavages.)

Accepted Answer

According to Duverger's theory, PR systems tend to encourage the emergence of multiple parties due to the lower electoral threshold required for a party to gain representation. With a permissive form of PR in the United States, there would likely be more opportunities for smaller parties to gain representation, leading to an increase in the number of parties in the legislature. This is especially true given the heterogeneous nature of American society which would likely lead to a variety of platforms and cleavages that could be represented by different parties.

Question 18

To test Duverger's theory, we need to have a measure of the number of cleavages in a society. The measure that is used most often is the effective number of ethnic groups. What does an analyst need to assume if she is to use this measure?

Accepted Answer

The analyst needs to assume that all of the nonethnic cleavages in a society (class, religion, region, and so on) are highly correlated with the ethnic cleavages. This is because the effective number of ethnic groups measure takes into account all types of cleavages, not just ethnicity. Therefore, the measure assumes that all cleavages in a society are related to each other in some way, either through overlap or intersection.

Question 19

The results of empirical tests of Duverger's theory show that increasing ethnic heterogeneity always leads to more legislative parties, regardless of the permissiveness of the electoral system.

Accepted Answer

Empirical tests have shown that Duverger's theory does not always hold true and increasing ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily always lead to more legislative parties. Depending on other factors such as the structure of the electoral system, it is possible for ethnic groups to coalesce around major parties or for new parties to form that do not necessarily represent specific ethnic groups.

Question 20

Posner's study of the Chewas and Tumbukas in Zambia and Malawi suggests that ethnic groups in Africa nearly always organize politically along ethnic lines, unlike ethnic groups in other parts of the world, who are typically more responsive to the logic of minimal winning coalitions.

Accepted Answer

Posner's study does not suggest that ethnic groups in Africa nearly always organize politically along ethnic lines unlike other parts of the world; rather, it highlights how the political organization of ethnic groups, including in Africa, can be influenced by the size and composition of the groups relative to the political system, suggesting a more complex interaction than a simple tendency to organize along ethnic lines.

Quiz 13: Social Cleavages and Party Systems

When we talk about "district magnitude" we are referring to:

The mechanical effect of an electoral system refers to the way that votes are translated into seats.

In disproportional electoral systems, the mechanical effect rewards large parties and punishes small ones.

The existence of the mechanical effect of electoral systems creates an incentive for voters and elites to behave strategically.

Is the incentive to vote strategically higher or lower when the district magnitude is large?

No electoral rules allow a perfectly proportional transfer from votes into seats, although some electoral systems are much more proportional than others.

Why do electoral rules affect how many parties a country has?

What is the connection between district magnitude and the permissiveness of an electoral system?

France has recently banned people from covering their faces in public, which was widely understood to target Muslim women from wearing full-face veils. This indicates that the ______ cleavage is still salient in France.

According to Duverger's theory, when are you likely to see many parties in a country?

The results of empirical tests of Duverger's theory show that increasing ethnic heterogeneity always leads to more legislative parties, regardless of the permissiveness of the electoral system.

Nonpermissive electoral systems (such as single-member district plurality) are thought to benefit a small number of large parties because:

Duverger's theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society (few cleavages) uses permissive electoral rules, then it will have many parties.

Duverger's theory predicts that if a country with a homogeneous society (few cleavages) uses disproportional electoral rules, then it will have many parties.

According to the logic of Duverger's theory, if a country with a heterogeneous society (many cleavages) like Israel switched from its current permissive electoral rules to a disproportional system (such as the one the United States uses) , what would you expect to happen to its party system?

According to the logic of Duverger's theory, if the United States changed its electoral rules and adopted a permissive form of PR (with large district magnitudes) , what do you predict would happen? (You should assume that the United States has a fairly heterogeneous society-i.e., many cleavages.)

To test Duverger's theory, we need to have a measure of the number of cleavages in a society. The measure that is used most often is the effective number of ethnic groups. What does an analyst need to assume if she is to use this measure?

The results of empirical tests of Duverger's theory show that increasing ethnic heterogeneity always leads to more legislative parties, regardless of the permissiveness of the electoral system.

Posner's study of the Chewas and Tumbukas in Zambia and Malawi suggests that ethnic groups in Africa nearly always organize politically along ethnic lines, unlike ethnic groups in other parts of the world, who are typically more responsive to the logic of minimal winning coalitions.